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One Study, Two Paths
The Challenge of Dual-Use Research 
R
apid advances in biotechnology and genetics over 
the past 50 years have transformed medicine, 
agriculture, and industry. But these same 
developments have occurred at such a pace that 
the scientific community is only just beginning 
to address some of the new practical and ethical issues that have arisen. 
For instance, some research conducted in the service of humanity 
also carries inherent risks related to national security.
1 This so-called 
dual-use research, with its potential to be used for both beneficial and 
detrimental purposes, raises thorny questions for investigators, funding 
agencies, and science journals worldwide.
New Policy Meets New Research
Dual-use research is the subject of a new policy issued by the White 
House on 29 March 2012.
2 The policy was issued in the midst of an 
ongoing international debate surrounding two articles submitted to 
Nature and Science. Each article documents successful attempts at mak-
ing the deadly avian influenza (H5N1) virus more easily transmissible 
between mammals—and hence, potentially, a better biological weapon—
setting off a firestorm within the scientific community. 
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Both studies used ferrets as a model to 
demonstrate that a genetically modified 
H5N1  virus  could  become  readily 
transmissible between mammals, although 
it remains unclear how this virus would 
affect humans. In addition to concerns 
over how would-be terrorists might use 
the research, grave concerns exist that an 
engineered H5N1 virus could escape from 
the laboratory. According to the World 
Health Organization (WHO), H5N1 kills 
60% of the people it infects,
3 although 
this figure is much debated since it does 
not include people who may get infected 
but do not visit a doctor.
4 In nature, the 
virus transmits rarely from birds to people 
(infecting only those in close proximity to 
birds, such as poultry workers) and even 
more rarely from person to person. 
The  two  papers  were  sent  to  the 
National Science Advisory Board for 
Biosecurity (NSABB), established by the 
U.S. government after the anthrax attacks 
of 2001 to provide advice, guidance, and 
leadership on national security matters 
related to dual-use research.
5 Unlike most 
scientists, NSABB members have received 
“Secret” security clearance and thus are 
equipped to assess national security risks 
of research. After deliberating amongst 
themselves and talking with both papers’ 
lead authors (Ron Fouchier of Erasmus 
Medical Center in the Netherlands and 
Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of 
Wisconsin–Madison), in December 2011 
all 23 NSABB members voted unanimously 
to recommend the two journals redact 
key parts of the manuscripts, allowing the 
sensitive portions to be made available to 
researchers only on a need-to-know basis. 
Although under no legal obligation to do 
so, the journals and researchers agreed, 
although Science stipulated that the U.S. 
government  would  need  to  provide  a 
“written, transparent plan” for making the 
redacted information available for “all those 
responsible scientists who request it” as part 
of their work.
6 
On the heels of the NSABB decision, 
39 influenza researchers including Fouchier 
and Kawaoka voluntarily agreed to a 60-day 
moratorium on H5N1 research,
7 which was 
later informally extended.
3 NSABB chairman 
Paul Keim, a biology professor at Northern 
Arizona University, called this “an Asilomar 
moment” in scientific history, referring to the 
1975 gathering of scientists at the California 
conference site to draw up guidelines for 
safely advancing then-nascent recombinant 
DNA technology—a meeting widely hailed 
as a model for scientific self-regulation.
8 
With the research moratorium in place 
and the papers delayed, scientists and public-
health officials convened several international 
meetings to debate the dilemma. Should 
certain research on dangerous pathogens be 
government-classified to restrict access, as 
some nuclear research is, or can the scientists 
regulate their own work? Should this and 
other research with the potential for dual 
use even be conducted at all? Once a study is 
completed, can research results ever be fully 
contained? And what is the best way to get 
the broader scientific community thinking 
about the dual-use potential of their own 
research?
During the months after the NSABB’s 
initial decision, accusations and heated 
words flew across the Internet, in the 
media, and at conferences. “The New York 
Academy meeting I attended on this
9 was 
as hostile a meeting as I can ever recall,” 
says Ron Atlas, a biology professor at the 
University of Louisville and coauthor of a 
seminal 2004 National Research Coun-
cil document on dual-use research.
1 “The 
panel was split into those who absolutely 
felt the [H5N1] research should go ahead 
and those who felt we needed to put it all 
back in the box.”
Then the situation took an unexpected 
turn. A February 2012 meeting convened 
at the WHO headquarters in Geneva cul-
minated in a letter signed by 22 scientists 
and public-health officials from 11 nations 
calling for full publication of the H5N1 
papers—in contrast to the NSABB’s rec-
ommendation.
10  A  few  days  later,  the 
United States asked the NSABB  to recon-
sider revised versions of the manuscripts 
with additional information about the 
transmissibility of the engineered viruses 
from both studies. In a surprise move, the 
NSABB reversed course, recommending 
full publication. The board’s consensus 
was that the research was not as dangerous 
as it initially seemed. However, that was 
not the only factor in the switch. 
“The truth is that they found out they 
couldn’t make redaction work in the sense 
that there wasn’t a good international 
mechanism for forwarding the details to 
people who needed to know, and no agency 
was willing to take it on,” says NSABB 
member Ken Berns, a professor of molecu-
lar genetics at the University of Florida. 
Classification and control of research also 
has potential to undermine international 
cooperation under the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention of 1975, a multilat-
eral disarmament treaty prohibiting the 
use, possession, and production of biologi-
cal weapons. 
The Nature article was published 
online 2 May 2012.
11 At press time, the 
Science article had not been published. 
Dual-Use Research in Many 
Disciplines
As defined in the 2004 National Research 
Council report colloquially called the Fink 
Report,
1 dual-use research is that which 
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Scope of the Federal Policy on Dual-Use Research2
This policy calls for the regular review of research funded or conducted by the 
government with regards to its potential for dual use. Reviewers will focus 
onresearch involving one or more of the agents in List A that intentionally or 
unintentionally produces or could produce one or more of the effects listed in List B. 
A. Pathogens and toxins
Avian influenza (H5N1) virus •	
Bacillus anthracis •	  
Botulinum neurotoxin  •	
Burkholderia mallei •	  
Burkholderia pseudomallei •	  
Ebola virus  •	
Foot-and-mouth disease virus  •	
Francisella tularensis •	  
Marburg virus  •	
Reconstructed 1918 influenza virus  •	
Rinderpest virus  •	
Toxin-producing strains of   •	
Clostridium botulinum 
Variola major virus  •	
Variola minor virus  •	
Yersinia pestis •	  
B. Effects
Enhances the harmful consequences of the   •	
agent or toxin.
Disrupts immunity or the effectiveness of an  •	
immunization against the agent or toxin without 
clinical or agricultural justification.
Confers to the agent or toxin resistance to clinically  •	
or agriculturally useful prophylactic or therapeutic 
interventions against that agent or toxin or facilitates 
their ability to evade detection methodologies.
Increases the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to  •	
disseminate the agent or toxin.
Alters the host range or tropism of the agent or toxin. •	
Enhances the susceptibility of a host population to the  •	
agent or toxin.
Generates or reconstitutes an eradicated or extinct  •	
agent or toxin from the list above.  
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could be misapplied to cause substantial 
damage to human health, agriculture, the 
environment, the economy, or national 
security. A subset of dual-use research that 
is deemed by the NSABB to be especially 
harmful if misapplied is known as “dual-
use research of concern” (DURC).
12 
Dual-use research can occur in many 
academic disciplines. During the advent 
of atomic physics, Leó Szilárd, the discov-
erer of the nuclear chain reaction, real-
ized its potential for mass destruction.
13 
He discussed with other nuclear scien-
tists whether they should self-regulate their 
work and keep results secret to avoid nucle-
ar reactions being weaponized. Indeed, 
discoveries subsequently published by other 
physicists eventually led to the creation of 
the atomic bomb; today, most U.S. nuclear 
weapons research is classified.
14 Dual-use 
research may also include encryption and 
cryptography, psychological research that 
could be used to develop mind-control 
techniques,
15 engineering research includ-
ing weaknesses of the electric power grid 
or building design flaws, and research on 
public-health vulnerabilities.  
One of the most contentious papers 
in dual-use history is a 2005 study that 
showed how a mere 4 g of botulinum 
toxin dispersed at one dairy plant could 
kill 400,000 people.
16 The authors’ intent 
was to show how to protect the U.S. milk 
supply, but the paper came under fire by 
the government because the information 
could easily be countermined for malicious 
intent. The Department of Health and 
Human Services asked the Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences not 
to publish the paper,
17 but the journal 
proceeded with publication, opining in an 
editorial not only that the public should be 
made aware of the danger but that free and 
open scientific inquiry ultimately makes 
the public safer.
18 
The potential for dual-use research in 
the environmental health sciences is less 
clear-cut, but it does exist. For instance, 
in 1943, botany student Arthur Galston 
published his thesis on chemicals that 
hasten the development of flowering 
plants. After military researchers read 
the thesis, they used Galston’s findings 
to develop the defoliant Agent Orange, a 
chemical whose use in the Vietnam War 
has caused human health problems ever 
since.
19 The thesis would not likely have 
been flagged as dual-use research because 
Galston did not address military tactics. 
But the example illustrates how seemingly 
innocuous research can lead to unintended 
consequences.
David Resnik, a bioethicist with the 
National Institute of Environmental 
Health Sciences (NIEHS), says most 
environmental-health research that could 
cause harm would not do so on the scale 
or the scope that could be expected with 
something  like  dangerous  pathogens. 
Nevertheless, the possibility does exist, and 
training is conducted across the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), including the 
NIEHS, to alert researchers to dual-use 
potential. 
Jonathan Suk, a social scientist at the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control, and his colleagues argue that 
more attention should be paid to low-tech 
threats, such as direct contamination of 
food and water, given the much lower 
technical hurdles involved compared with 
obtaining, engineering, or weaponizing 
a dangerous pathogen. They point out 
that the only known case where a terrorist 
group employed a biological agent in the 
United States involved a low-tech attack: 
In 1984 the Rajneeshee cult contaminated 
salad bars in The Dalles, Oregon, with 
Salmonella, which caused 751 illnesses but 
no deaths. On the other hand, the Japanese 
cult Aum Shinrikyo was unsuccessful in its 
attempts to obtain and disperse anthrax 
and botulinum toxins, and it is believed 
that al-Qaeda attempted to obtain the 
means to create a biological weapon in the 
early 2000s but failed to do so.
20
Self-Regulation versus 
Government Regulation
The newly released federal policy on dual-
use research aims to catch research at the 
proposal stage, because dealing with a 
completed manuscript once it is submitted 
to a journal causes numerous practical 
challenges.
21 For instance, journal editors 
may be unable to adequately assess the 
biosecurity risks of research, and once 
a manuscript is written it is virtually 
impossible to control its spread worldwide.
The policy applies to all extramural 
and intramural research funded by the 
government but not to research funded 
by other sources. Under the policy, all 
research-funding government agencies must 
review currently proposed and ongoing 
research projects to identify those that 
involve any of 15 high-concern pathogens 
and toxins (see box). For projects identified 
as such, researchers are required to develop 
“risk mitigation plans.” If they are unable to 
develop an acceptable plan, the policy states 
that “Federal departments and agencies 
will determine whether it is appropriate 
to: (a) request voluntary redaction of the 
research publications or communications; 
(b) classify the research . . . [or] (c) not 
provide or terminate research funding.”
2
Berns is pleased that in issuing the 
policy the White House finally acted on 
a recommendation the committee made 
six years ago. “There was a lot of concern 
[among NSABB members] over waiting 
until work gets sent for publication to 
think about its dual-use implications,” he 
says. “This way, before the whole [study] 
gets started, people can think about what 
it could mean, what the issues might be, 
and both the researchers and funders can 
act accordingly.”
Some argue that researchers may not 
always willingly put national security inter-
ests above their own career advancement.
13,22 
“Meaningful self-regulation has not been 
forthcoming from within the science com-
munity,” says Rutgers University microbiol-
ogist Richard Ebright, an outspoken critic 
of the two H5N1 studies, who believes they 
should never have been conducted. 
Ebright prefers a proactive approach 
on the part of the government. “Oversight 
needs to come from the public and policy 
makers,” he says. “Pathogens researchers 
have made it clear: Left to their own devic-
es, they will disregard the public interest.”
But researchers may not always be 
capable of assessing the dangers of their 
research. Michael Selgelid, director of the 
Centre for Human Bioethics at Monash 
University in Australia, warned against 
this in a 2009 Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization article, writing, “Because 
scientists generally lack training in security 
studies, they may lack the expertise 
required for assessment of the security risks 
of publication in any given case.”
13 
One example of this lack of expertise 
is an article published in the Journal of 
Virology documenting the creation of a 
potent mousepox strain that killed mice 
normally resistant to the virus.
23 Although 
not  dangerous  to  humans,  the  same 
technique could potentially be used to 
create a more virulent smallpox strain, 
yet neither the researchers nor the journal 
editors had access to government-classified 
information about smallpox proliferation. 
With access to such information, the 
researchers  potentially  could  have 
assessed the dual-use possibilities of their 
research before conducting it and acted 
accordingly. 
One perceived challenge of increased 
oversight of dual-use research includes 
concerns that such oversight could soak 
up time, money, and personnel. However, 
two separate surveys by NIH investigators 
suggest otherwise. Molly S. Stitt-Fischer 
and colleagues reviewed 3,444 annual 
research progress summaries submitted 
to NIH in 2009 and flagged just 2.9% 
in an initial screening as having dual-
use  potential.
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and colleagues reviewed 734 research 
registration documents submitted to the 
NIH Institutional Biosafety Committee 
(IBC) between 2004 and 2008. In an 
initial screening they flagged 1.6% as 
potentially being in the more restrictive 
DURC category, but after a more detailed 
review they determined that none of the 
studies’ research data or products could be 
readily utilized to cause public harm.
25
“Overseeing just [a minuscule fraction] 
of research projects could not possibly ‘bring 
science to a stop,’ as some have argued,” 
says Ebright. Indeed, he argues that failing 
to monitor these projects actually poses the 
greater risk for science. Without oversight, 
he says, those few DURC projects put the 
vast majority of studies at significant risk. 
“When the first major lab accident with an 
engineered pathogen occurs, there will be 
a draconian reaction from the public and 
policy makers,” he says. “That reaction will 
not be focused on the very small group that 
needs oversight but on biomedical research 
as a whole.”
Putting Awareness into Action
But some investigators are concerned at 
the prospect of increased government 
surveillance of research in the name of 
national security. “I think most scientists 
want to publish their research without 
worrying about red tape or political 
controversy,” says Resnik. “Most journal 
editors don’t want to deal with outside 
interference from the government or any 
other organization.” 
Resnik and colleagues at the NIEHS 
conducted a random survey of 400 life-
sciences journals to determine how many 
had dual-use policies in place. Of the 
155  that  responded,  only  7.7%  had  a 
written policy for how to deal with dual-
use manuscripts that may cross their desk, 
with 5.8% having reviewed such a study 
during the previous five years. In written 
responses to the survey, one editor reported 
having reviewed what turned out to be 
dual-use manuscripts but had never heard 
the term “dual use.” Some responded 
negatively to the idea of a dual-use policy. 
For instance, one editor appeared to believe 
it would involve employing two different 
methods of peer review.
26
EHP began actively evaluating papers 
for their dual-use potential in 2009 and 
in February 2010 added a statement to its 
Instructions to Authors
27 that additional 
expert advice would be sought if the edi-
tors had concerns about a manuscript. “The 
editors of EHP strongly support the unre-
stricted communication of research findings, 
but the journal also has a responsibility not 
to publish work that could be readily used 
to cause public harm,” explains EHP science 
editor Jane Schroeder. “To date we have not 
received any such papers, which is not sur-
prising given that most research that would 
be considered ‘dual use’ is outside EHP’s 
scope. However, we will continue to monitor 
papers submitted to EHP.”
If  researchers  consider  dual-use 
potential in their work from the outset, 
they are more likely to be in a position to 
evaluate benefits and risks of a particular 
project and to mitigate any potential risks 
before a project begins, and less likely to 
meet controversy when such work reaches 
publication stage. “Scientists really ought 
to be alert to the question of whether or 
not what they’re doing could be misused in 
a way that could be harmful,” says Berns. 
The  bones  of  a  system  to  review 
proposals for dual-use potential exists with 
university-level IBCs, but the true mission of 
these committees is to review recombinant 
DNA technology and laboratory safety. “My 
sense is that those groups don’t think about 
dual use, just biosafety, and it’s a burden to 
put on a different hat,” says Atlas. 
An informal poll of various institutions 
conducted in the course of writing this 
article suggests it’s a mixed bag as to whether 
a given university’s IBC has any dual-use 
policy, although this was one of the key 
recommendations in the Fink Report.
1 
“That idea has not been widely accepted in 
the scientific community,” Atlas says.
When scientists met in Asilomar in 
the 1970s, they applied the precautionary 
principle  in  working  out  a  consensus 
statement on how to regulate their own 
work on recombinant DNA technology.
21 
The present “Asilomar moment” has the 
potential to work itself out as successfully 
as the early use of that biotechnology 
did.
8 But as an issue of global import, 
international cooperation will certainly be 
necessary to ensure public safety as well as 
the march of scientific progress.
“Even  to  the  extent  that  the  U.S. 
classifies research, they can only classify 
U.S. research; they can’t classify foreign 
research,” says Atlas. “The ultimate solution 
lies with voluntary action of the life-
sciences community. That’s not to say there 
should not be government advice, such as 
the NSABB, but mandatory controls won’t 
work when you’re dealing with a global 
enterprise. It remains to be seen how you 
make this a globally accepted policy.”
Wendee Holtcamp, based in Houston, Texas, has written for 
Nature, Scientific American, National Wildlife, and other 
magazines.
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